Robert De Pauw's Aston Villa: Formation, tactics and style of play

A new series showcasing the tactical profiles of every Women's Super League team in partnership with The Underrated Scout

Aston Villa manager Robert de Pauw. Credit: Aston Villa

This piece is part of a special Team Profiles series with The Underrated Scout. Across the next few months we’ll be publishing pieces on the tactics, style of play and trends of every WSL team.

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Aston Villa have undergone significant changes following a somewhat disappointing campaign last season which saw them finish 7th in the Women’s Super League. The club made a managerial switch in the summer with the appointment of coach Robert de Pauw. While Villa’s current form shows glimpses of improvement, results have remained inconsistent. This analysis will delve into their tactical setup, highlighting areas of progress as well as those requiring further adjustments to propel the team back into contention for a top-five spot in the WSL.

Attacking structure

Base formation

Aston Villa’s preferred formation this season is a 4-2-3-1, transitioning from last year’s 4-3-3. In their approach, the wingers—typically Kirsty Hanson and Chasity Grant—tuck in narrowly to occupy central spaces, often playing on their inverted foot, leaving the full-backs, Dan Turner and Noelle Maritz, responsible for providing width by overlapping constantly.

The striker is tasked with either stretching the opposition’s defensive line or dropping deeper to link up play, with the latter being the more common approach; it’s not unusual to see Rachel Daly dropping into midfield to receive the ball. When this occurs, the attacking midfielder, whether Gabi Nunes or Kenza Dali, pushes forward into the vacated space, otherwise they position themselves between the lines to enable quick combination play. The double pivot lacks a traditional ‘holding player’, whether it’s a ball-winner or deep-lying playmaker, so the duo of Missy Bo Kearns and Jordan Nobbs alternate between stepping forward and holding to screen the defence, with Nobbs slightly more inclined to drive the ball upfield.

Build up

In build-up play, Villa tend to structure with four players: the goalkeeper, the two centre-backs, who split wide, and one of the pivots dropping deep to form a diamond shape. The two full-backs push higher, positioning themselves around the midfield line, while the wingers tuck in to create central density. This setup is designed to invite some pressing from the opposition, thereby freeing up space for either the other pivot or the attacking midfielder to receive the ball in central areas, or for the full-backs, if the flanks are left open. This allows them to progress through quick passing combinations and one-twos.

If the opposition presses aggressively on the full-backs, the second pivot drops deeper as well, creating an outlet if unmarked. If they are tracked, this opens up space for the winger to make a run, along with the passing lane to feed them.

If the opposition opts for a more passive approach, sitting in a mid or low block without pressing intensely, it’s not uncommon for Aston Villa to push one of the centre-backs higher up the pitch to create a numerical advantage and open up new passing lanes further forward. This highlights the significant trust De Pauw has in the technical ability of his deeper players, particularly the centre-backs and Jordan Nobbs, who are encouraged to take more risks in possession. Given the quality of passing from the back, a direct long ball from the centre-back to the winger is also a viable option that Villa don’t shy away from.

The tendency for the wingers to tuck inside is also supported by data. For example, we can see how the starting duo of Hanson and Grant receive the ball much more frequently in central channels than near the touchline when in the opposition's half. This positioning favours the quick combinations we’ve mentioned, whether it’s with the midfielders, the striker dropping deep, or the overlapping full-back.

In the 4-2 defeat to Brighton, Aston Villa adopted a different shape, likely to counter Brighton’s highly aggressive pressing. In this setup, the right-back, Maritz, stayed deeper, acting as an additional centre-back and effectively forming a back three. This 3-2-2-3 shape featured the left-back and the attacking midfielder on the same horizontal line, with the former providing width on the left and the latter occupying the right half-space. The front three adjusted accordingly, with the left winger tucking in closer to the striker and the right winger staying wide, ensuring optimal coverage across the pitch. This structure allowed Villa to counter Brighton’s man-to-man press by drawing out five players. With Brighton committing players forward, Villa were able to exploit the space left behind their pressing block by bypassing the midfield with a lofted pass, finding the attacking midfielder or winger in open areas to advance the ball. The receiver now finds themselves in acres of space, and could then drive forward and attack the opposition’s defensive line.

Defensive structures

When playing with a back four, Aston Villa typically defend in a 4-4-2 shape. The attacking midfielder pushes up alongside the striker, positioning themselves to block vertical passing lanes into the opposition’s central midfielders, aiming to cut off supply and force play out wide. The double pivot controls the central area without forcing strict man-marking engagement, while the wingers close down the opposition full-backs once they receive the ball. Notably, the winger on the far side tucks in centrally, marking the nearest midfielder, further ensuring that central passing options are shut down, directing the opposition towards the flanks.

When using a back three, Aston Villa's out-of-possession shape shifts into a 5-2-2-1, with Grant acting as a right wingback. Meanwhile, the two defensive midfielders, the left winger, and the attacking midfielder form a box midfield. This structure allows the pivots to block through passes and compete for first and second balls in direct play, while the two advanced midfielders contribute to the press and help direct the opposition’s play.

De Pauw's approach aims to keep the team compact both in and out of possession, preventing the lines from stretching and limiting space between them. This allows Villa to maintain a high or medium block, even against top teams like Chelsea or in key matches against Brighton and Tottenham. While this minimises central spaces, it leaves the team vulnerable to balls in behind, putting pressure on the centre-backs to recover and the goalkeeper to sweep up. Additionally, this compactness exposes Villa to switches of play to the weak side, as seen in recent goals conceded against Tottenham and Brighton. In both cases, a diagonal pass behind the right wingback led to a first-time cross for the striker to finish.

One key issue in Aston Villa's defensive phase is the double pivot. Neither Nobbs nor Bo Kearns are natural holding midfielders, and while they shine in possession, they struggle when tracking back. Their lack of positional awareness for the role sometimes leads to mistakes—either leaving space behind or both dropping too deep, exposing the edge of the box. In this example, Bo Kearns’ positioning provides necessary cover, but Nobbs is too far forward, leaving space for an uncontested shot from the edge of the area.

The duo also struggles in duels, both indirect (interceptions) and direct (tackles). While their ball recovery stats are decent, their numbers in the aforementioned areas are below what's needed to shield the defence effectively. This results in less defensive coverage and more pressure on the backline. Lucy Staniforth offers some improvement in interceptions when replacing Bo Kearns, but the pivot remains somewhat 'light' and a potential weakness at this stage. However, as the season progresses, some of these issues may improve as the players become more familiar with the role.

Pressing

Aston Villa can adapt their pressing intensity depending on the opponent or match situation. Typically, they use their 4-4-2 defensive shape to block central lanes, with the striker and attacking midfielder pushing the ball wide or forcing long passes, although they can be asked to target a specific centre-back and tight press them if they’re not amazing on the ball. Once the ball reaches the full-backs or wingers, Villa's wide players press aggressively, while the far-side winger positions near the opposition’s midfielder to ensure they can’t receive wide open.

In the example above, Grant mistimes her press, allowing a vertical pass to the winger. Maritz quickly stepped up, closing them down to prevent a 1v1 and forcing Sandy Baltimore to retreat, reaching the backline and handing the ball to the centre-backs, making Chelsea reset the play. Dali also positioned herself ahead of Erin Cuthbert, ready to receive if Villa regained possession, temporarily cutting out Chelsea’s midfielder.

Villa’s midfielders tend to hold their position, stepping out only when there’s a clear chance to win the ball, while the centre-backs take turns breaking the line to close down strikers receiving with their back to goal. In certain situations, like goal kicks, Villa press high just outside the opponent’s box, but the same principles apply.

It’s worth noting that against Brighton, Villa applied a more aggressive press than usual. Villa marked Brighton’s three centre-backs man-to-man with their front three. This had to be adjusted once Paula Tomas’ was sent off . The more aggressive approach was effective, with the first goal coming from a high turnover and it will be interesting to see if they reuse this tactic against other teams playing with a back three.

Transitional play

In offensive transitions, De Pauw's team is proactive and organised, pushing forward with multiple players, but also patient. They don't force the final pass if there’s no space, often recycling possession through the centre-backs to rebuild the attack when needed. They primarily use two patterns: quickly seeking the wingers to exploit their speed and dribbling ability toward goal, or relying on Daly's strong hold-up play to link with advancing wingers and midfielders. This leads to Daly arriving slightly later in the box, making it harder for defenders to mark her.

In negative transitions, a light counter-press is applied primarily to delay the opposition's advance and allow the team to reposition. However, this approach can still be effective in regaining possession. If the midfielders are caught out of position during this phase, the centre-backs are not afraid to step out of the defensive line and cover that space, thanks to their strong anticipation skills. The wingers and attacking midfielder are tasked with tracking the opposition’s full-backs and defensive midfielder, although, as we've seen, they can sometimes struggle in this aspect.

Conclusions

Aston Villa have demonstrated moments of tactical sharpness and offensive potential, thanks to quick wing play, rapid passing sequences and good technical ability, making them a dangerous team on the attack. However, their inconsistency, particularly in negative transitions, midfield balance and defending wide spaces, raises questions about whether they have the depth and stability to compete with top-half teams consistently. To push further up the WSL standings and even contend again for a top-five finish, Villa will need to refine their defensive structure. How effectively they address these areas will likely define their season.